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Abstract
To inform the ongoing debate over graduate student unionization, the author tests for the presence of union-
related premiums among teaching and research assistant stipends using data from The Chronicle of Higher
Education’s survey of departments in six fields in 2000, 2001, and 2003. Ordinary least squares and instrumental
variables methods reveal union and union threat premiums among teaching assistant stipends. There is little
evidence of union-related premiums among research assistant stipends. Specifications controlling for union
composition or using employment weights reveal that the teaching assistant only union premium is positive for
teaching assistant stipends and negative for research assistant stipends. This suggests that collectively bargained
contracts may yield benefits for teaching assistants at the expense of research assistants when the latter are
excluded from the bargaining unit. There is a positive premium to joint teaching and research assistant unions
for teaching assistant stipends and no eﬀect for research assistant stipends.
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1 Introduction
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently issued its ruling against graduate student unionization
at Brown University, a reversal of its landmark ruling in New York University in 2000. In contrast, union
organizers at public institutions have been increasingly successful in securing collectively bargained contracts
beginning with the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in 1969. Graduate student unionization may have non-
trivial economic eﬀects on the stipends received by graduate students and the research and instructional labor
costs paid by universities. A well-informed debate on the issue demands an understanding of these economic
consequences and has implications for administrators and graduate student voters considering unionization.
The graduate student unionization movement stems largely from student dissatisfaction with increased teach-
ing demands without commensurate increases in stipends. Cutbacks in state and federal appropriations have
forced institutions of higher education to reduce instructional costs by shifting teaching burdens away from tenured
faculty members toward relatively cheaper graduate students and adjunct faculty (Ehrenberg and Zhang 2005).
These increased teaching demands may contribute to the well-documented rise in time to degree for doctoral
students (Bowen and Rudenstine 1992). Indeed, many graduate students are motivated by this line of reasoning:
a case study indicates that increased time to degree is among the primary reasons cited for seeking union status
(Julius and Gumport 2002).
This paper draws on the union wage gap and union threat literatures. Several papers have focused on
the union wage diﬀerential in higher education in particular. For example, Monks (2000) finds that faculty
unionization is associated with a 7 to 14 percent wage premium, and Klaﬀ and Ehrenberg (2003) find evidence of
a modest union eﬀect on higher education staﬀ salaries. While there is a growing literature on the legal context of
graduate student unionization and case studies of its economic eﬀects, I contribute to the literature by providing
the first estimates of the union wage eﬀect for graduate student unions in a multivariate panel data setting.
This paper also utilizes a novel measure of union threat to estimate its impact on stipends. Previous empirical
research typically uses union density in a cross-industry or cross-region framework as the measure of union threat
(e.g. Neumark and Wachter 1995). This paper measures union threat using data on organizing activity from
the Council of Graduate Education Unions, an organization that supports graduate student unions. Colleges
and universities face a union threat when ununionized graduate students have organized in conjunction with
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established unions such as the United Auto Workers or the American Federation of Teachers or have secured a
graduate student body vote on unionization.
In this paper, I estimate union-related premiums separately for teaching and research assistant stipends using
a survey of graduate departments administered by The Chronicle of Higher Education. Survey respondents in
biology, economics, English, history, mechanical engineering, and sociology departments provided data on stipend
levels for teaching and research assistants for 2000, 2001, and 2003. The primary independent variables of
interest are union and union threat. The baseline specification is an ordinary least squares approach controlling
for department rank, institutional wealth, cost of living, employment size, and contract conditions along with field
and year fixed eﬀects. Using data collected from union contracts, I also estimate reduced-form models identifying
unions as teaching assistants only or both teaching and research assistants. To purge the estimates of union-
related premiums from the biasing eﬀects of endogeneity, I estimate instrumental variables specifications using
public status, the share of workers in the state represented by unions, and their interaction as instruments for
union-related activity. Lastly, because error terms among departments in a given institution may be correlated,
I estimate a set of seemingly unrelated regression models.
2 The Process of Graduate Student Unionization
The typical process of unionization begins with a movement to secure a graduate student body vote on
unionization. This organizing eﬀort often comes with the assistance of established unions such as the United
Auto Workers and the American Federation of Teachers. If the student body votes to unionize, typically by
majority vote, then the academic institution may choose to recognize the union as a collective bargaining unit.
Should the institution recognize the union, the two parties then negotiate over an employment contract for all
students covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
The unionization process is subject to legal constraints imposed by state legislatures and the National Labor
Relations Board. The legal debate focuses on determining whether teaching and research assistants are primarily
students or primarily employees. As subdivisions of the state, public colleges and universities are exempt
from laws requiring union recognition (Pollack and Johns 2004). However, many states have passed legislation
permitting graduate students to form unions and collectively bargain for wages and benefits. Public institutions
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in states where graduate students are designated as primarily students are not required to recognize a student
body vote on unionization or any union association formed among students.
Successful graduate student unions have taken on issues beyond stipends such as fringe benefits and insti-
tutional governance. For example, the Graduate Employees Organization at the University of Massachusetts
claims responsibility for securing free health insurance, tuition and fee waivers, reasonable workload standards,
grievance procedures, childcare, sexual harassment policies, and dental insurance (University of Massachusetts
GEO 2005). This behavior is consistent with union eﬀects on work conditions and fringe benefits in more general
settings (Freeman 1981). Despite these purported gains for graduate students, student support for unions is
not universal. For example, graduate students at the University of Minnesota voted against unionization three
consecutive times (Jaschik 2005).
The legal constraints at private institutions are markedly diﬀerent from their public counterparts. Legal
precedent by the NLRB viewed graduate students at private institutions as students rather than as employees,
a view typically supported by administrators at colleges and universities. Despite this legal environment, Yale
University’s Graduate Employee Student Organization went on strike in 1995 in an unsuccessful attempt to
compel the university to recognize it as a union (Cage 1995). Over the next several years, graduate students at
other prestigious private institutions made headway in the process to unionize. These eﬀorts peaked when a case
on the legality of graduate student unionization at New York University reached the NLRB. The case attracted
significant national attention and included amicus briefs from prominent educational organizations and highly
ranked colleges and universities. In New York University (332 NLRB No. 111 2000), the board reversed almost
thirty years of precedent by ruling in favor of the union organizers. Notably, research assistants were judged to
be working on research that would relate to their dissertations and thus were not serving primarily as employees.
The ruling precipitated a new wave of graduate student organizing. The NLRB issued similar rulings allowing
union elections to take place in Columbia University and Tufts University (Case No. 2-RC-22358 2002; Case No.
1-RC-21452 2002), and new votes were scheduled for Yale University and Brown University. However, union
support by graduate students at private institutions has not been universal. While organizers at Cornell University
were able to secure a vote, the graduate student body voted against unionization by 1,350 to 580 (Smallwood
2002). Similarly, Yale University graduate students rejected unionization by 694 to 641 (Greenhouse 2003).
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Four years later, a newly appointed NLRB heard arguments from graduate students and administrators in
Brown University (342 NLRB No. 42 2004).1 The board reversed its previous ruling and designated teaching
assistants as primarily students who receive financial aid rather than as workers who receive compensation for
services rendered. Graduate students at private universities are no longer employees and are thus not eligible
to unionize and collectively bargain for stipends and benefits. The institutional response to Brown University
has been swift. Regional boards of the NLRB overturned an earlier ruling allowing a union election at Tufts
University (Case 1-RC-21452 2005). In August, 2005, the administration at New York University declared that
it would no longer recognize the graduate student union, and the former graduate student union responded with
a general strike starting in November (Arenson 2005, Finder 2005).
3 The Data
The primary goal in this paper is to estimate the magnitude of union-related premiums among graduate
student stipend levels. To test for evidence of these premiums, I construct a panel dataset with the department-
year as the unit of analysis. The Chronicle of Higher Education surveyed graduate departments on teaching
and research assistant compensation for academic years (AY) 2000, 2001, and 2003.2 In 2000 and 2001, the
sample consisted of 45 institutions and was expanded to 83 institutions in 2003. The survey provides data on
teaching and research assistants on stipend levels, contract length in months and expected hours of work per
week, and student and family health insurance for biology, economics, English, history, mechanical engineering,
and sociology departments.
I merge institution—year expenditure data on instruction, research and public service, academic support,
student services, instructional support, operation and maintenance, scholarships and fellowships, and transfers
from the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Dataset (IPEDS). The sum of these categories divided by the
number of full-time equivalent students is the measure of institutional wealth. The proxy for cost of living is the
1Again, myriad groups weighed in with amicus briefs including American Council on Education, National Association of Indepen-
dent Colleges and Universities, American Association of University Professors, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Committee of Interns and Residents, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Trustees of Boston Uni-
versity, and a joint brief by Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, George Washington
University, Tufts University, University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern California, Washington University in St. Louis, and
Yale University.
2The data are available on the newspaper’s online website, http://www.chronicle.com. Throughout the paper, I refer to an
academic year by the year of the fall semester. For example, 2003 refers to academic year 2003-2004.
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estimated cost to an undergraduate for room, board, and other expenses for an oﬀ campus apartment without
a family. Data from the National Research Council’s rankings of doctoral programs by field are included as a
control variable (National Research Council 1995). I also incorporate data from the Survey of Graduate Students
and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering on the number of teaching assistants and the number of research
assistants for biological sciences, economics, mechanical engineering, and sociology department-years.
[Table 1. Union-Related Activity by Institution]
My measures of union-related activity at each institution come from the Council of Graduate Education
Unions, Julius and Gumport (2002), and other sources including news coverage in the press. Table 1 lists
the institutions in the sample and identifies the academic years graduate student unions first earn university
recognition and first negotiate a contract through the collective bargaining process. There are 25 institutions
with graduate student unions as of AY 2004. Columns (4) and (5) indicate whether teaching assistants and
research assistants are members of the collective bargaining unit from 2000 to 2004. I use data from the Council
of Graduate Education Unions to identify institutions where although graduate students formed an organization
with support from an established local union or held a student body election on unionization, they are unrecognized
by the institution. Departments in these institutions are subject to union threat. Six of the 14 institutions
under union threat are private institutions. Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of institutions with collectively
bargained contracts from 1969 to 2005. The spike in 1993 corresponds to the system-wide contract at the State
University of New York, and the activity in 2001 coincides with the NLRB ruling in New York University and
the contract agreement at the University of California campuses.
[Figure 1. Cumulative Number of Institutions with Collectively Bargained Contracts: 1969 to 2005]
I provide descriptive statistics of the pooled dataset in Table 2. The dataset contains teaching assistant stipend
levels for 805 department-years and research assistant stipend levels for 591 department-years. All monetary
figures are in 2000 dollars. The mean stipend levels paid to teaching and research assistants are $12,340.03 and
$13,271.77 respectively, and a standard t-test rejects the hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the two means
is equal to zero. The average rank for both types of graduate assistants is approximately 43, although it is
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important to note that rankings are an ordinal measure, not a cardinal measure.3
[Table 2. Department Sample Descriptive Statistics]
I designate a department-year as unionized if stipend levels in the year are determined through a collective
bargaining process and a department-year as under union threat if the graduate students have organized with
the support of an established union or held an election on unionization without recognition by the institution
in that year. A subset of department-years face recognized unions without collectively bargained contracts. I
experiment with categorizing them as union threat in the strict definition of union (threat1) and as unions in a
weak definition (union2). Using the strict definition, 24.1 percent of the teaching assistant department-years and
22.5 percent of research assistant department-years are unionized. According to the weak definition, these shares
are 29.7 percent and 28.6 percent respectively. The shares of department-years subject to union threat under the
strict definition are 23.2 percent for the teaching assistant sample and 26.4 percent for research assistant sample.
Disaggregating the union sample by collective bargaining unit composition reveals that teaching assistants are
always covered by graduate student unions, but there is variation in whether research assistants are included.
19.9 percent of the teaching assistant department-years face a teaching assistant only union and 4.2 percent face a
joint teaching and research assistant union. The comparable shares for the research assistant department sample
are 17.9 percent and 4.6 percent respectively.
The mean cost of living is $8,808.78 for the teaching assistant sample and $8,910.10 for the research assistant
sample. Contracts for research assistants are on average longer than those for teaching assistants. The mean
department-year employs 34.96 teaching assistants and 73.11 research assistants in each respective subset of
biology, economics, mechanical engineering, and sociology department-years.
4 Empirical Methodology
The baseline empirical approach is to estimate a typical program evaluation reduced-form specification by
regressing the natural log of the stipend level on institutional and department characteristics.4 The empirical
3This implies that diﬀerences between rankings not uniform and that comparisons between fields may not be appropriate.
4Lewis (1986) provides an excellent survey on the estimation of union relative wage eﬀects.
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specification is:
lnYijt = Xijtβ + Zjtγ +mi + nt + εijt (1)
In equation (1), Yijt is the stipend for department i at institution j in year t, and Xijt consists of department level
characteristics including the time invariant National Research Council department rank in its field, the number of
teaching (or research) assistants employed by the department, and the contract length in months. Department
rankings pose a methodological problem because rankings are an ordinal measure and not comparable between
fields. Consequently, the specification includes dummy variables for department j being ranked in the first ten
departments and for being ranked in the second ten departments. Institution level characteristics in Zjt consist
of dummy variables for union and union threat, the natural log of total expenditure per full time equivalent
student, and the natural log of the estimated cost of living. The specification also includes field fixed eﬀects,
mi, year fixed eﬀects, nt, and a error term εijt. I run regressions separately for teaching assistant stipends and
research assistant stipends after a Chow test revealed structural diﬀerences in the baseline ordinary least squares
model.5
Because stipends for graduate students may not vary by student-level characteristics such as education or
experience, I estimate union-related diﬀerentials under the assumption that all teaching (or research) assistants
in a given department j in institution i in year t are identical. This allows me to use employment size as a
frequency weight for the subset of biology, economics, mechanical engineering, and sociology departments for
more precise estimates at the cost of a reasonable assumption.
Union-related activity may be endogenous because departments that pay lower stipends may be prone to union-
related activity. A standard approach to treat this endogeneity is to employ an instrumental variables method.
Descriptive and legal research on the presence of graduate student unions have identified public institution status,
legality of public sector unionization, and the degree of unionization statewide as predictors of union status (Julius
and Gumport, 2002). Unfortunately, state variation in the legality of public sector unionization is perfectly
correlated with union status in this sample. The empirical results using either the share of employees that are
members of unions and the share of employees represented by unions are qualitatively similar, and my preferred
5The Chow test is an F-test for diﬀerences in coeﬃcients (Chow, 1960). The test statistic in the baseline specification is 2.63
and the critical F20,∞ = 1.57 at the 5 percent level.
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specification uses the latter, the public status of the institution, and an interaction term as the instruments for
union activity.
The errors terms across departments and within an institution may be correlated. I estimate seemingly
unrelated regression models after a Breusch-Pagan test suggests that the error terms in each equation are corre-
lated. This may not be surprising because departments that pay more than their predicted stipend levels may be
at institutions that systematically pay generous stipend levels for all departments. Department level variation
within an institution comes from variation in rankings and contract lengths. I use the numerical value of the
department rank in these estimates instead of the dummy variables for first and second ten ranked departments.
5 Results
Table 3 presents the results from the baseline reduced-form specification using the strict definition of union.6
All subsequent comments in this section refer to coeﬃcient estimates that are statistically significant at the
5 percent level unless otherwise noted. Column (1) uses department-level teaching assistant stipends as the
dependent variable. Relative to sociology departments, teaching assistant stipends in biology departments are
5.6 percent greater. Teaching assistant stipends are not statistically diﬀerent across the three ranking categories.
I find evidence of a 4.7 percent union stipend premium and a 6.6 percent union threat premium, suggesting
that departments facing union activity pay their teaching assistants higher stipends, all else equal. The sign
of the coeﬃcient estimates for institutional wealth and cost of living are of the expected sign. Stipends for
teaching assistants increase 0.10 percent and 0.19 percent for every 1 percent increase in the expenditure per full
time equivalent student and cost of living respectively. The estimate of the coeﬃcient on employment size is
statistically significant and positive but of magnitude close to zero.
[Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend)]
The estimates using department research assistant stipends as the dependent variable are provided in column
(3). There is substantial variation in stipends between fields. Biology and mechanical engineering departments
pay higher stipends and English and history departments pay lower stipends relative to sociology departments.
6Results using definition 2 and estimates using numerical rank instead of the top ten and second ten dummy variables are
qualitatively similar and are available from the author upon request.
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To the extent that the distribution of research assistant stipends is equal to the distribution of stipends of
teaching assistants without unionization, this is consistent with evidence that graduate students in the sciences
are more often opposed to unionization relative to those in arts and humanities (Julius and Gumport 2002). The
greater variation across subjects among research assistant stipend levels may reflect more pervasive union wage
compression among teaching assistants. There is no evidence of any rankings premium among research assistant
stipends in this specification and no evidence of any union or union threat eﬀect. Departments with higher
levels of expenditure per full time equivalent student pay greater stipends at the ten percent significance level,
but higher costs of living are not associated with stipends, all else equal.
Columns (2) and (4) provide the results after controlling for union coverage. Surprisingly, the bulk of the
union premium for teaching assistants takes place at departments subject to joint teaching and research assistant
unions. There is no evidence of any union premium when the department is covered by a teaching assistant only
union. In contrast, there is a —8.4 percent return to having a teaching assistant only union on research assistant
stipend levels. This is the first piece of evidence suggesting that departments subject to teaching assistant only
unions reduce the stipend paid to research assistants.
[Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Results with Employment Weights (Dependent Variable: Natural Log
Stipend)]
Under the assumption that all teaching or research assistants in a given department-year are paid the equally, I
weight the sample by the employment size for a subset of fields. After dropping English and history departments,
the sample consists of 17,200 teaching assistants and 29,242 research assistants. The results in Table 4 for
department premiums are similar to the unweighted sample for teaching assistants. However, teaching assistants
at departments ranked in the top ten of their field receive 2.4 percent more than those at departments ranked
beyond twenty. Teaching assistants at departments ranked in the second ten make 1.3 percent less than those
ranked beyond twenty. These results are similar to Rees’ (1993) evidence that faculty salaries at better ranked
institutions are paid higher salaries. There is evidence of a 6.0 percent union wage premium and a 2.9 percent
union threat premium for teaching assistants. In column (2), I find positive premiums among teaching assistant
stipends for both teaching assistant only unions and joint teaching and research assistant unions, and the larger
premium comes from unions composed of both types of graduate student assistants.
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The results for research assistants in the weighted sample are similar to those in the unweighted sample.
Notably, there is a weak negative eﬀect of unions on the whole for research assistants, but when controlling
for composition, there is evidence of a —2.8 percent eﬀect of teaching assistant only unions and a 6.8 percent
eﬀect of joint teaching and research assistant unions. This suggests that while both teaching and research
assistants in unions that cover both types of assistants receive positive wage premiums, teaching assistants under
teaching assistant only unions receive higher stipends while research assistants receive lower stipends. In both
specifications, departments facing the threat of a union pay greater stipends to research assistants.
[Table 5. Selected Instrumental Variables Results for (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend)]
Table 5 presents selected coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors for the instrumental variables specifications
using institutional public status, the share of state employees represented by unions, and the interaction between
as instruments for the unweighted sample. Columns (1) and (3) present estimates instrumenting for both union
and union threat. Among teaching assistant departments, there is no evidence of any union premium but strong
evidence of a 30.5 percent union threat premium. For research assistant departments, there is weak evidence of
a negative eﬀect of having a union. In columns (2) and (4), I instrument for any union activity defined as either
having a union or under union threat. In this specification, there is evidence of a 7.3 percent premium to union
activity for teaching assistants and no evidence of any premium for research assistants.
[Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Results with Contract Experience Control (Dependent Variable: Natural Log
Stipend)]
Barbezat (1989) and Rees (1993) use similar reduced-form models to estimate the union wage diﬀerential
among faculty salaries but control for the length of time the department has been subject to the collective
bargaining process. Estimates in Table 6 include the time since first contract as a control, and the time for
department-years without contracts are coded as zero. For teaching assistant departments, an additional year
subject to collective bargaining decreases the stipend paid to teaching assistants by 0.4 percent. There is evidence
of a 5.1 percent return to teaching assistant only unions and a 22.0 percent return to joint teaching and research
assistant unions. In contrast, an additional year subject to collective bargaining increases the stipend paid to
research assistants by 0.5 percent. However, there is a —13.8 percent return to teaching assistant only unions and
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no eﬀect of joint coverage unions. This provides additional evidence that collectively bargained contracts where
research assistants are excluded from the bargaining unit are associated with premiums for teaching assistant
stipends and a penalties for research assistant stipends. Moreover, teaching assistant stipends diminish and
research assistant stipends rise with union experience.
[Table 7. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend)]
Lastly, using the within institution variation in department ranking and length of contract, I estimate a series
of seemingly unrelated regression models. Although the sample size decreases dramatically to only include
institution-years that have data for all six departments, the Bruesch-Pagan test on the reduced sample suggests
that the error terms across equations are correlated. The results of this specification are provided in Tables 7 and
8. The top panel provides selected coeﬃcients and standard errors for the teaching assistant department sample.
Although the sample sizes are small, there is evidence of returns to department rank for mechanical engineering
departments and weak evidence for English departments. That is, better ranked departments in these fields
pay larger stipends to their teaching assistants. Moreover, there are positive returns to union threat in English
and sociology departments and weak evidence for economics and history. The bottom panel provides the results
for research assistants. Again, the sample size decreases dramatically as only 28 institution-years provide data
for all six departments. There is evidence of positive union and union threat eﬀects for biology and sociology
departments.
[Table 8. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend)]
Table 8 presents the results controlling for collective bargaining unit composition. There is weak evidence
that better ranked departments in English and mechanical engineering pay higher stipends to teaching assistants.
There is no evidence of a teaching assistant only union premium in any field and positive returns to joint coverage
unions for biology, English, history, and mechanical engineering. Union threat is associated with an increase in
stipends in English, history, mechanical engineering, and sociology. The bottom panel for research assistants
indicates that better ranked history and mechanical engineering departments pay higher stipend levels. Surpris-
ingly, there is a positive return to teaching assistant only unions among mechanical engineering and sociology
departments. I find positive eﬀects of joint coverage unions in biology, English, and sociology departments, and
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evidence of a union threat premium in mechanical engineering and sociology departments.
6 Discussion
The primary objective is to test for the presence of union and union threat premiums using data from a
survey of biology, economics, English, history, mechanical engineering, and sociology departments administered
by the Chronicle of Higher Education. I find that there are indeed returns to union-related activity among
stipend levels. Evidence of positive union and union threat premiums among teaching assistants is robust across
a variety of estimation techniques. In contrast, there is less evidence of a union premium on research assistant
stipends and often of negative sign when weakly statistically significant. I do not find a union threat eﬀect for
research assistant stipends. Controlling for union composition, there is consistent evidence of a negative return
to teaching assistant only unions among research assistant stipend levels and a positive premium among teaching
assistant stipends.
Despite department rank playing a role in faculty compensation (Rees 1993), it is only modestly associated
with graduate student stipend levels. In the weighted specification, top ten departments pay higher stipend levels
relative to departments ranked beyond twenty for both teaching and research assistants. Teaching assistants in
the second ten ranked departments receive lower stipends and research assistants in the second ten receive higher
stipends relative to those beyond twenty. While the seemingly unrelated regression specifications suﬀer from
small sample size, I find evidence that higher quality departments in some fields pay greater stipends even after
controlling for institutional wealth and cost of living.
These findings suggest that union organizers have been successful at raising stipend levels for their teaching
assistant members. However, stipend increases for teaching assistants may come at the expense of research
assistants unless the latter are included in the collective bargaining unit. This result is consistent with anecdotal
evidence that science and engineering graduate students, predominantly research assistants, often oppose union-
ization. Joint composition unions are also not associated with stipend increases for research assistants. Union
threat is associated with stipend increases for teaching assistants, perhaps because institutional administrators
raise stipends to stave oﬀ attempts to organize graduate students into a union. There is less evidence of a union
threat eﬀect for research assistant stipends.
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These estimated union-related premiums yield voting predictions for graduate students considering unioniza-
tion. Assume that students vote on stipends only, union-related premiums are those estimated in columns (2) and
(4) in Table 6, the stipends paid to teaching and research assistants in the absence of unionization are equal, and
students who are indiﬀerent abstain and write their dissertations or teach instead. Consider the restrictive case
where students are assigned to either teaching or research assistantships for the entire duration of graduate study.
At institutions where graduate students vote on a teaching assistant only union, the estimated premiums predict
that teaching assistants vote in favor and research assistants against it. Unionization passes by majority vote
when there are more teaching assistants than research assistants. When considering a joint coverage union, the
results predict that teaching assistants vote for unionization and research assistants are indiﬀerent. Unionization
passes whenever there are teaching assistants at the institution.
Alternatively, consider the more realistic case where students switch between teaching and research assis-
tantship positions over the course of their graduate careers. Assume graduate students vote by comparing the
expected sum of their stipend levels with and without unionization. Because the loss to research assistants is
larger in magnitude than the gain to teaching assistants, the results predict that teaching assistant only union-
ization passes when more than half of the graduate students are teaching assistants for at least 73 percent of
the time.7 The estimated premiums predict that unionization for joint coverage unions always passes whenever
students spend positive time as teaching assistants.
What about the labor costs paid by institutions? In the case where assistantship assignments are fixed,
institutions face greater labor costs when they contract with a teaching assistant only union and at least 73
percent of the students are teaching assistants. Labor costs for joint coverage unions unambiguously rise when
there are any teaching assistants. When students switch between teaching and research assistantships, labor
costs rise when at least 73 percent of the graduate students are teaching assistants in a given period. Institutions
with negotiated contracts with joint coverage unions have unambiguous increases in labor costs. These back of
7Let x be the number of semesters as a teaching assistant and T be the time to degree. Then a student votes for unionization if
x1.051 lnw + (T − x) (1− 0.138) lnw > T lnw (2)
x
T
0.051 >
³
1− x
T
´
0.138 (3)
x
T
> 0.730 (4)
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the envelope calculations suggest that joint coverage unions are more likely to win majority approval by graduate
students but result in higher labor costs for the institution. Teaching assistant only unions may cost the institution
less, but as the probabilty of winning majority student support rises, institutional resistance increases.
Stipends, however, are not the only issue of concern to graduate student unions. Subsequent empirical
research should explore the union eﬀect on fringe benefits such as institutional support for student and family
health insurance. Studies can also explore whether union membership reduces time to degree for graduate
students. Institutional expenditure and the quality of instruction for undergraduate students are additional
factors that may be aﬀected by unionization and deserve attention as administrators, graduate students, and
lawyers debate the merits of graduate student unionization.
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Table 1. Union-Related Activity by Institutiona 
Institution AY. 
Recogn. 
AY 
Contract 
TA 
Union 
RA 
Union 
Union 
Threat 
Arizona State University      
Boston University      
Brandeis University     Yes 
Brown University     Yes 
California Institute of Technology              
Carnegie Mellon University      
Clemson University      
Colorado State University      
Columbia University     Yes 
Cornell University     Yes 
Duke University      
Emory University      
Florida State University      
Georgia Institute of Technology      
Harvard University      
Indiana University at Bloomington      
Iowa State University      
Johns Hopkins University      
Kansas State University      
Kent State University      
Lehigh University      
Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge      
Massachusetts Institute of Technology      
Michigan State University 2000 2003 Yes No  
New York University 1999 2001 Yes Yes  
North Carolina State University      
Northeastern University      
Northwestern University      
Ohio State University     Yes 
Oregon State University 1999 2000 Yes Yes  
Pennsylvania State University at University Park     Yes 
Princeton University      
Purdue University      
Rice University      
Rutgers University (Newark) 1972 1972 Yes Yes  
Saint Louis University      
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale      
Southern Methodist University      
Stanford University      
State University of New York at Albany 1992 1993 Yes No  
 20
State University of New York at Binghamton 1992 1993 Yes No  
State University of New York at Buffalo 1992 1993 Yes No  
State University of New York at Stony Brook 1992 1993 Yes No  
Syracuse University      
Temple University 2001 2002 Yes Yes Yes 
Texas A&M University at College Station      
Tulane University      
University of Alabama at Birmingham      
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville      
University of California at Berkeley 1983 2001 Yes No  
University of California at Davis 1993 2001 Yes No  
University of California at Irvine 1998 2001 Yes No  
University of California at Los Angeles 1994 2001 Yes No  
University of California at Riverside 1997 2001 Yes No  
University of California at San Diego 1992 2001 Yes No  
University of California at Santa Barbara 1994 2001 Yes No  
University of Colorado at Boulder      
University of Florida 1981 1981 Yes Yes  
University of Hawaii-Manoa      
University of Houston (University Park)      
University of Idaho      
University of Illinois at Chicago 2005    Yes 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 2002 2004 Yes No Yes 
University of Iowa 1995 1997 Yes Yes  
University of Kansas 1994 1997 Yes No  
University of Kentucky      
University of Louisville      
University of Maine      
University of Maryland at College Park     Yes 
University of Memphis      
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor 1973 1974 Yes No  
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities     Yes 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln      
University of Nevada at Reno      
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill      
University of Oklahoma at Norman      
University of Oregon 1976 1979 Yes No  
University of Pittsburgh      
University of Rochester      
University of Southern California     Yes 
University of Southern Mississippi      
University of Tennessee at Knoxville      
University of Texas at Austin      
University of Toledo      
 21
University of Utah      
University of Vermont      
University of Virginia     Yes 
University of Washington at Seattle 2004 2005 Yes Yes Yes 
University of Wisconsin at Madison 1969 1969 Yes No  
University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee 1990 1991 Yes No  
University of Wyoming      
Utah State University      
Vanderbilt University      
Virginia Commonwealth University      
Virginia Tech      
Washington State University      
Washington University in St. Louis      
Wayne State University 1997 1999 Yes No  
Western Michigan University      
a The complete list of sources is available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Number of Institutions with Collectively Bargained Contracts: 1969 to 2005 
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Table 2. Department Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean St. Dev.  N Mean St. Dev. 
 TA    RA   
stipenda 805 12340.030 2616.997  591 13271.770 3487.058 
ln_stipend 805 9.396 0.230  591 9.450 0.334 
BIO 805 0.178 0.382  591 0.220 0.415 
ECO 805 0.175 0.380  591 0.166 0.372 
ENG 805 0.164 0.370  591 0.127 0.333 
HIS 805 0.164 0.370  591 0.117 0.321 
MEC 805 0.157 0.364  591 0.212 0.409 
SOC 805 0.163 0.369  591 0.159 0.366 
first10 805 0.109 0.312  591 0.115 0.319 
second10 805 0.120 0.326  591 0.130 0.337 
other 805 0.657 0.475  591 0.646 0.479 
rank 714 43.064 31.702  527 42.627 32.369 
r_00 805 0.294 0.456  591 0.284 0.451 
r_01 805 0.247 0.432  591 0.220 0.415 
r_03 805 0.458 0.499  591 0.496 0.500 
union1 805 0.241 0.428  591 0.225 0.418 
union1_ta 805 0.199 0.399  591 0.179 0.384 
union1_tara 805 0.042 0.201  591 0.046 0.209 
threat1 805 0.232 0.423  591 0.264 0.441 
union2 805 0.297 0.457  591 0.286 0.452 
threat2 805 0.176 0.381  591 0.203 0.403 
ln_exp_fte 794 10.463 0.568  583 10.474 0.564 
ln_cola 723 9.068 0.175  533 9.081 0.163 
empl 492 34.959 29.200  400 73.105 101.965 
contract_mo 544 9.300 0.961  371 10.164 1.439 
public 805 0.684 0.465  591 0.699 0.459 
reppct 805 0.156 0.065  591 0.152 0.062 
a Stipends, total expenditure per full time equivalent, and cost of living are in 2000 dollars. 
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TA  RA  
BIO 0.056** 0.061** 0.170*** 0.172*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.047] [0.047] 
ECO -0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.013 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.041] [0.041] 
ENG 0.011 0.009 -0.147** -0.150** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.058] [0.058] 
HIS -0.031 -0.032 -0.126** -0.124** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.059] [0.059] 
MEC 0.001 0.007 0.086** 0.089** 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.040] [0.040] 
union1 0.047** — -0.047 — 
 [0.019]  [0.032]  
union1_ta — 0.014 — -0.084** 
  [0.020]  [0.035] 
union1_tara — 0.191*** — 0.088 
  [0.037]  [0.060] 
threat1 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.025 0.021 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.033] [0.033] 
empl 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln_exp_fte 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.051* 0.047* 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.027] [0.027] 
ln_cola 0.185*** 0.195*** 0.103 0.090 
 [0.043] [0.043] [0.078] [0.078] 
contract_mo 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] 
Observations 805 805 591 591 
R-squared 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.31 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include time fixed effects, dummy variable for department ranked 
in the top ten, dummy variable ranked in the second ten, and missing value flags for empl, 
ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Results with Employment Weights (Dependent Variable: Natural Log 
Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TA  RA  
BIO 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] 
ECO 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.009 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
MEC 0.003 0.004 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
first10 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] 
second10 -0.013*** -0.010** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
union1 0.060*** — -0.005* — 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  
union1_ta — 0.038*** — -0.023*** 
  [0.004]  [0.003] 
union1_tara — 0.176*** — 0.063*** 
  [0.007]  [0.005] 
threat1 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
empl 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln_exp_fte 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
ln_cola 0.154*** 0.167*** 0.082*** 0.074*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] 
contract_mo 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Constant 5.883*** 5.873*** 7.109*** 7.224*** 
 [0.084] [0.083] [0.065] [0.065] 
Observations 17,200 17,200 29,242 29,242 
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.45 0.45 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include time fixed effects, dummy variable for department ranked 
in the top ten, dummy variable ranked in the second ten, and missing value flags for empl, 
ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
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Table 5. Selected Instrumental Variables Results for (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TA  RA  
union1 -0.01 — -0.125* — 
 [0.041]  [0.066]  
threat1 0.305*** — 0.152 — 
 [0.080]  [0.104]  
union — 0.073*** — -0.038 
  [0.028]  [0.050] 
Observations 805 805 591 591 
R-squared 0.08 0.28 0.26 0.30 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include field dummy variables, department ranked in the top ten, 
dummy variable ranked in the second ten, employment, natural log of expenditure per full 
time equivalent student, natural log of cost of living, and missing value flags for empl, 
ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Results with Contract Experience Control (Dependent Variable: Natural 
Log Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TA  RA  
BIO 0.058** 0.063** 0.178*** 0.180*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.047] [0.047] 
ECO 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.012 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.041] [0.041] 
ENG 0.010 0.008 -0.150*** -0.153*** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.058] [0.058] 
HIS -0.032 -0.034 -0.128** -0.126** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.059] [0.059] 
MEC 0.004 0.009 0.089** 0.092** 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.040] [0.040] 
contracttime -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.005** 0.005** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
union1 0.087*** — -0.099** — 
 [0.023]  [0.040]  
union1_ta — 0.051** — -0.138*** 
  [0.024]  [0.042] 
union1_tara — 0.220*** — 0.037 
  [0.039]  [0.064] 
threat1 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.030 0.027 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.033] [0.033] 
empl 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln_exp_fte 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.051* 0.047* 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.027] [0.026] 
ln_cola 0.166*** 0.178*** 0.142* 0.13 
 [0.044] [0.043] [0.080] [0.080] 
contract_mo 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] 
Observations 805 805 591 591 
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include time fixed effects, dummy variable for department ranked 
in the top ten, dummy variable ranked in the second ten, and missing value flags for empl, 
ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
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Table 7. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Teaching Assistants 
 BIO ECO ENG HIS MEC SOC 
Rank 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
union1 0.005 0.033 0.025 0.043 -0.054 0.031 
 [0.038] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041] [0.061] [0.041] 
threat1 0.039 0.083* 0.105** 0.085* 0.089 0.091**
 [0.045] [0.049] [0.046] [0.046] [0.066] [0.045] 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 
       
Research Assistants 
 BIO ECO ENG HIS MEC SOC 
Rank -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] 
union1 0.530*** -0.093 0.199 0.175 0.091 0.302***
 [0.114] [0.062] [0.159] [0.151] [0.083] [0.082] 
threat1 0.409*** -0.058 0.155 0.270* 0.051 0.253***
 [0.130] [0.065] [0.166] [0.156] [0.078] [0.083] 
Observations 28 28 28 28 28 28 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include employment, natural log of expenditure per full time equivalent student, 
natural log of cost of living, and missing value flags for empl, ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
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Table 8. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log Stipend) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Teaching Assistants 
 BIO ECO ENG HIS MEC SOC 
dept_rank 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
union1_ta -0.015 0.017 0.004 0.022 -0.011 0.014 
 [0.036] [0.043] [0.039] [0.040] [0.061] [0.041] 
union1_tara 0.431*** 0.243* 0.344*** 0.361*** -0.360** 0.238* 
 [0.118] [0.141] [0.126] [0.128] [0.176] [0.128] 
threat1 0.032 0.074 0.097** 0.078* 0.108* 0.082* 
 [0.041] [0.049] [0.044] [0.044] [0.065] [0.044] 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 
       
Research Assistants 
 BIO ECO ENG HIS MEC SOC 
dept_rank 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.002** -0.009*** -0.002 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] 
union1_ta 0.257 -0.082 0.126 0.117 0.198** 0.244***
 [0.179] [0.059] [0.155] [0.150] [0.077] [0.083] 
union1_tara 0.920*** 0.082 0.541** 0.437* -0.139 0.463***
 [0.261] [0.097] [0.272] [0.263] [0.127] [0.125] 
threat1 0.073 -0.052 0.132 0.275* 0.180** 0.234***
 [0.208] [0.061] [0.160] [0.154] [0.074] [0.079] 
Observations 28 28 28 28 28 28 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other control variables include employment, natural log of expenditure per full time equivalent student, 
natural log of cost of living, and missing value flags for empl, ln_exp_fte, ln_cola, and contract_mo. 
 
